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Drawing a Line Between Killing
and Letting Die:
The Law, and Law Reform,
on Medically Assisted Dying
Lawrence 0. Gostin
raditional medical ethics and law draw a sharp
distinction between allowing a patient to die and
helping her die. With olding or ithdrawing life
sustaining treatment, such as by abating technological
nutrition, hydration or respiration, will cause death as
surely as a lethal injection. The former, however, is a
constitutional right for a competent or once-competent
patient,' while the latter poses a risk of serious criminal or
civil liability2 for the physician, even if the patient requests
it.
The confusion engendered by the line drawn by
ethicists and lawyers between killing and letting die is
illustrated by a series of cases. Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a
retired pathologist, has used a "suicide machine" on
several patients he barely knew.3 The suicide machine is
constructed to allow the patient to perform the final act
leading to death. Dr. Kevorkian has continued to use his
suicide machine despite an injunction issued by a Michi-
gan court 4 and the revocation of his medical license in
Michigan in 19915 and in California in 1993.6
Dr. Timothy Quill wrote a sensitive account of his
decision to prescribe barbiturates to a patient and to
instruct her on how many tablets to take to end her life.7
The case differed from those of Dr. Kevorkian in that a
longstanding physician/patient relationship existed and
Dr. Quill had encouraged his patient to continue therapy
for her terminal condition. "I wonder why," Dr. Quill
wrote, "Diane who gave so much to so many of us had to
be alone for that last hour of her life."
Additional accounts of physicians who knowingly
hastened death have appeared in the literature. In an
anonymous account published in JAMA ("It's Over,
Debbie"), a physician claimed to have injected morphine
sulfate sedative into a patient who appeared to be in pain,
thereby causing her death.' In another instance, Dr.
Ronald Cranford wrote about his difficult decision to use
an increasing dose of morphine on a patient knowing it
would seriously depress her respiration. His intent was
not to kill, but he knew it might speed her death. She died
following one of the injections. 9
In each of these cases death resulted, in one degree or
another, from the physician's actions. Yet none of these
physicians was convicted for assisting the patient's death.
Three first degree murder charges were dismissed against
Dr. Kevorkian; 0 a grand jury refused to indict Dr. Quill;
authorities sought to uncover the identity of the author of
"It's Over, Debbie," but no prosecution resulted; law
enforcement agencies showed no interest in prosecuting
Dr. Cranford.
The general public appears to look more favorably
upon physician assisted dying than do the medical or legal
professions. Referenda in the states of Washington 12 and
California13 were narrowly defeated. The Initiatives would
have made these states the first jurisdictions in the West-
ern Hemisphere to legalize medical aid in dying. (The
practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands is not endorsed
by statute, but is tolerated under specified circumstances
under a ruling by the Dutch Supreme Court). 4 In a
Harvard School of Public Health/Boston Globe opinion
poll, 64 percent of those interviewed favored physician
assisted suicide by terminally ill patients who request it.'5
Around the same time, a practical guide on how to
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics
commit suicide, Final Exit, reached the top of the New
York Times Best Seller List.16
While much has been written about the professional
ethics of physician assisted dying,17 little is known about
where the law draws the line, whether the law is enforced
in practice, and how the law should be reformed to reflect
changing public opinion and ethical thought. This article
addresses these questions and the need for clearer public
policy on physician assisted dying.
Distinguishing killing from letting die
A substantial body of court decisions18 and scholarly
publications 9 has established that the risk of criminal
liability for withdrawing or withholding treatment in
accordance with the wishes of a patient or her surrogate
is vanishingly small. The abatement of treatment is not an
affirmative act, but rather a failure to provide further
treatment. There is no criminal liability for failure to act
unless there is a legal duty to act. The physician certainly
has a duty toward her patients and ordinarily must use
professional skill to promote the patient's health and save
life. No duty to provide treatment arises, however, where
a patient or her surrogate requests abatement of treat-
ment.
The courts are still developing the exact parameters
of the right to have treatment withheld or withdrawn.20
Certainly, a clear expression by a currently competent
adult to abate treatment must be respected by the physi-
cian. 21 Elizabeth Bouvia, for example, could require re-
moval of a nasogastric tube, pursuant to her belief that the
burdens of artificial feeding outweighed the benefits of
continued life with quadriplegia. 22 Modern courts have
tended also to respect the wishes of patients to refuse a
blood transfusion pursuant to their religious beliefs.23
The decision to abate treatment belongs to the currently
competent patient, not her physician, relatives or the
courts. Nor must a competent patient be comatose or
terminally ill to refuse treatment.24
Courts have extended this nearly absolute right of
self-determination to incompetent patients whenever there
is clear evidence that the patient, while competent, would
have declined treatment.2s Courts, however, understand-
ably look searchingly at the patient's medical condition or
prognosis before sanctioning surrogate decisions for in-
competent patients who have not expressed a clear posi-
tion for abating treatment. The physician certainly has no
duty to treat when the surrogate makes a request on
behalf of a patient who is terminally ill26 or in a persistent
vegetative state. 27 Nor have modern courts required judi-
cial approval for these decisions to abate treatment.2 The
physician's legal responsibilities are much less certain
when the patient has a chronic disease with a low quality
of life, such as dementia. A physician would be unwise to
abate life sustaining treatment in such a case unless that
decision has been previously sanctioned by a state court.
The physician, therefore, has no duty to treat a
patient against her expressed wishes or best interests.
Indeed, the physician may have an affirmative duty not to
treat in these circumstances. Failure to follow the current
or advance directives of a patient is more likely to result
in liability than a decision to abate treatment.z-
Barber v. Superior Court0 is the only case in which
a physician was convicted for abating treatment in accor-
dance with the request of the patient or her surrogate, and
that conviction was overturned by the California Court of
Appeal. The Barber court held that the omission to
continue life support, although intentional and with the
knowledge that the patient would die, was not an unlaw-
ful failure to perform a legal duty where the patient was
"deeply comatose" and the decision was in accordance
with the wishes of the family. Many courts reason that
abatement of life sustaining treatment does not constitute
suicide, because death occurs not at the hand of the
physician, but due to the underlying disease.31
While a physician may "let a patient die" in accor-
dance with the patient's expressed wishes or best inter-
ests, she cannot take active steps to end life. The Bouvia
court said that "it is a crime to aid in suicide," or to engage
in "assertive, proximate, and direct conduct such as
furnishing a gun, poison, knife, or other usable instru-
mentality or means by which another could physically
and immediately inflict some death producing injury
upon himself." Other courts have emphatically rejected
"active euthanasia"3 2 or "mercy killing."33
The determination of what is criminal and what is
lawful is not understood by examining the physician's
motives. The fact that a physician is motivated by the
desire to end unendurable pain and suffering is irrelevant
to criminal liability. 34 The critical element is intent or
knowledge. Did the physician intend to kill or know that
death would result? Thus, a physician who injects or
prescribes a sedative with the primary intent of reducing
suffering would be acting lawfully even if she were aware
of the depression of respiration. If the physician intended
or knew the medication would depress respiration suffi-
cient to cause death, criminal liability could ensue. This is
no easy distinction to make in practice, but the law
appears to rely on it.
Legal prohibitions against physician assisted dying
English common law punished suicide and attempted
suicide with forfeiture of the person's property and igno-
minious burial.35 Punishment, however, was reduced if
the motive was "weariness of life or impatience of pain,"
and no penalty ensued if the person was insane.31 The law
has recognized a person's pain and suffering since the time
of Blackstone,3 7 although suicide was not completely
excused even for the "hopelessly diseased."38
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During the colonial period, the United States clearly
opposed suicide. However, by the 19th century suicide
was no longer considered a criminal offense. Currently,
with one possible exception, 9 no state in the United States
punishes suicide or attempted suicide. 40 Yet, prohibitions
against assisting a person to commit or attempt suicide
can be found in the criminal law. While it may appear
illogical to punish a physician for assisting a patient to do
something that is legal, the reasoning is that it is practi-
cally impossible to impose a sanction on the patient; the
law also seeks to protect patients against undue influence
to consent to medically aided dying.
The physician risks criminal liability when she: (1)
directly causes the patient's death, for example, by admin-
istering a lethal dose of medication; (2) induces the patient
to take her own life by force, duress, or deception; or (3)
assists the patient to take her own life by providing
medical advice or providing the means. The modern law
is on a surer footing when dealing with, causing or
inducing suicide than when assisting it.
Directly causing the patient's death
A physician who directly takes the life of a patient
commits a criminal offense even if the patient desires to
die. A physician would be regarded as the agent of a
patient's death if she administered medication or other
medical procedures with the intent or knowledge that the
patient would die. Thus, the administration of a lethal
injection is a crime irrespective of the patient's wishes,
quality of life or prognosis. Non-physicians have been
convicted of criminal homicide for injections of a fatal
dose of licit or illicit drugs at the request of the person.41
A physician's license to practice medicine would not
excuse her from liability in such circumstances.
A physician who actively participates in the act of
causing death, such as by placing the lethal dose of
medication in the patient's hand or mouth,42 risks pros-
ecution for murder or manslaughter. 43 The physician
would not be considered to be assisting suicide under a
state statute providing for a lesser offense.44 Most statutes
prohibiting assisted suicide do not contemplate active
participation in an overt act directly causing death, but
only some participation in the events leading up to the
commission of the suicide, such as furnishing the means. 4
A modern day example is provided in People v.
Cleaves.46 Cleaves was living with and helping a friend
who was in an advanced stage of AIDS. He met another
person with AIDS and, after a lengthy discussion, that
person resolved to commit suicide. The person with AIDS
tied a sash around his neck, asked Cleaves to tie his hands
and feet with the sash from his neck, and proceeded to
strangle himself. The California Court of Appeal held that
if the defendant actually participates in the death of the
suicide victim, he is guilty of murder. Neither the consent
of the victim nor the absence of malice reduced the crime
of murder.
Inducing a patient to commit suicide
A physician may also be convicted of criminal homicide
for inducing a patient to kill herself by force, duress, or
deception. 47 Such purposeful action to cause a person's
death would be viewed as homicide in all jurisdictions.4 8
Strong persuasion of a person to commit suicide, while
not amounting to force or duress, may be viewed as undue
influence. A physician is in a position to exercise authority
over the patient and must exercise restraint in directly
influencing the patient's decision to take her own life. 49
The theoretical underpinning for convicting a physi-
cian for causing or inducing a person's suicide is that
consent is not a defense to most criminal offenses: "Mur-
der is no less murder because homicide is committed at the
desire of the victim."50 The interest protected by the
criminal law is considered public, not private. sl The
patient's consent or submission to the physician's lethal
procedure is, therefore, immaterial.
Assisting suicide
While causing or inducing suicide is uniformly considered
a crime, no national consensus exists about assisting
suicide by providing medical advice (e.g., discussion
about effective or painless ways to commit suicide) or by
providing the means (e.g., writing a prescription). The
law is relatively clear in those 26 states that have enacted
specific statutes prohibiting assisted suicide. s2 Michigan
enacted a statute in February, 1993 that made assisted
suicide a felony punishable by up to four years imprison-
ment and a $2,000 fine.S3 The statute was held unconsti-
tutional in May, 1993 by Judge Cynthia Stevens of the
Wayne County Court. Judge Stevens found that the
statute was enacted without public hearings. The Michi-
gan Attorney General has filed an appeal against Judge
Stevens' decision S4 Statutes in two other states prohibit
causing suicide, but not assisting it.5 5 Two additional
states appear to retain assisted suicide as a common law
offense.5 6 A person who assists another to die in a state
that specifically recognizes the crime is unlikely to be
charged with a more serious offense such as murder or
solicitation to murder.5 7
The states that specifically prohibit assisted suicide
either classify it as a unique offense (e.g., CA, NY) or
define it as a type of murder or manslaughter (e.g., AZ,
OR, HI). Assisted suicide statutes in several states are part
of, or coexist with, natural death acts (e.g., KS, WA, WI).
The Model Penal Code (sec. 210.5) establishes aiding or
soliciting suicide as an independent offense: "A person
who purposely aids or assists another to commit suicide
is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct
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causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, and other-
wise of a misdemeanor." Attempted suicide statutes pro-
hibit "intentional" or "purposeful" acts of assistance.
While some statutes merely prohibit wilfully "assisting"
or "abetting," many statutes also prohibit "advising" or
"encouraging."
Difficulties arise in states that have no statutory or
common law offense of assisted suicide. Several courts in
the late 18th and early 19th centuries held an individual
who assists in a suicide as a principal to murder.58 In
People v. Roberts, for example, a husband was convicted
of murder for assisting his wife to commit suicide. His
wife had multiple sclerosis and, at her request, he placed
a poisonous drink within her reach.59
It is exceedingly rare for a modern court to convict a
person of murder for assisting a suicide. A few modern
courts, in extreme cases involving violent deaths, have
found individuals guilty of the lesser offense of negligent
homicide60 or voluntary61 or involuntary manslaughter.12
In a few states, aiding or soliciting suicide has been held
to be no crime at all on the ground that suicide itself is not
unlawful. 63
Publication of a suicide guide
It is highly unlikely that the author of a suicide manual
could be convicted of the offense of assisted suicide in the
absence of any specific intent to kill an identifiable
person. A court in England refused to issue a declaration
to limit the distribution of the book published by EXIT,
The Guide to Self Deliverance. The court said that distri-
bution of the book could be a criminal offense only if the
defendant gave the book to a person intending to assist the
person to use the contents of the book to take his own
life.64 The general secretary of EXIT was convicted and
sentenced in another case for conspiracy for aiding and
abetting another's suicide through publication and distri-
bution of the guide. The Court of Appeal upheld the
conviction, not because of the publication, but because he
put the person "in touch" with an individual who he
knew would assist in the act of suicide."5
No such prosecution has occurred in the United
States despite the publication of Derek Humphry's Final
Exit and reports that the book was used by people taking
their own lives. Mere publication would not produce
liability. By analogy, a rock musician and others were
acquitted of aiding, advising or encouraging suicide for
recording and disseminating music which a teenager
listened to before killing himself.6"
Theory versus practice:
The absence of risk of criminal liability
Whether or not a state has an assisted suicide statute, it
will be difficult to use the criminal law against a person
who is generally motivated by the suffering of a relative,
a friend, or a patient. In most cases prosecutors or grand
juries refuse to indict, or juries find the person not guilty
or temporarily insane. In 20 cases of active and passive
euthanasia reported in two articles, only three involved
sentences of imprisonment. 7 These three cases, however,
were unusual because they involved either a gruesome
killing,68 a highly disputed motive,69 or disbelief that the
victim was terminally ill or in pain.70 Glantz suggests that
in practice, the chances of a conviction are remote if the
defendant is related to or knows the person well, performs
the act openly at personal risk, has reason to believe the
person is suffering, and there is no self-serving motive.7 1
In such cases the defendants' compassionate intentions
appear not only to lessen the offense or sentence, but
actually to absolve them of criminal liability. Otto Werner,
for example, suffocated his bedridden wife upon learning
that they were being sent to a nursing home. The judge
actually asked Mr. Werner to withdraw his guilty plea: "If
testimony was brought out of his devotion and care for his
wife, and her incurable illness and constant pain and
suffering, the jury would not return a verdict of guilty."'
In a search of reported decisions, no case was found
in which a health care professional was convicted of
causing, inducing, or assisting in the death of her patient.
In State v. Sander' a physician noted in the medical
record: "Patient was given 10 cc of air intravenously
repeated four times. Expired within ten minutes after this
was started." He was acquitted. In three additional cases
involving lethal injections of potassium chloride74 and
morphine, 7' health care professionals were acquitted. The
defense .in each case claimed that there was reasonable
doubt that the patient may have died not from the
injection but from the underlying disease. A Florida
district attorney decided not to prosecute a physician who
injected a patient with a dose of amytal sodium manufac-
tured more than 30 years ago. The district attorney said
a jury would not convict even though the doctor told the
patient's wife that he would die shortly after the injection.
The doctor's defense was that he was trying to ease pain
rather than kill, even though he was aware of the patient's
serious respiratory condition.
Dr. Jack Kevorkian has publicly claimed to have
assisted the death of a number of patients. Despite several
attempts by Michigan law enforcement authorities to
prosecute and convict him, he has yet to be convicted. Dr.
Kevorkian was charged with murder in connection with
his first three assisted suicides, but the charges were
dropped because Michigan had no law prohibiting as-
sisted suicide. He was arrested after the enactment of an
assisted suicide statute in Michigan but was not charged. 76
The criminal law, then, appears virtually ineffective
against health care professionals who can point either to
the patients' underlying conditions or to their own intent
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to comfort patients as a defense against criminal liabil-
ity. 7
Law reform on physician assisted dying
Both sides in the physician assisted dying debate agree on
the need for clearer public policy and law.7' At least some
evidence exists that, despite the AMA's rejection of active
euthanasia, 79 ethical and public opinion has perceptibly
shifted in favor of medical aid in dying. This shift is
reflected in the public's attitude favoring physician as-
sisted suicide;8" the refusal of prosecutors, grand juries
and juries to indict or convict health care professionals;
the growing number of respected physicians advocating
medical aid in dying as the last act in a continuum of care
provided to terminally ill patients;"1 and an emerging
argument by the legal profession that prohibitions of
assisted suicides are unconstitutional. 2
The law of assisted suicide serves no public purpose
and is unfair to physicians if it fails to forewarn clearly
about medical acts that are acceptable and those that will
be criminally punished. Despite the consensus on the need
for clearer public policy, few have come forward with
reasoned proposals; the literature has stalled on the sterile
question of whether euthanasia should be legalized. Rather,
the question to be put is: what aspects of physician
assisted suicide would provide most psychological com-
fort for the terminally ill without compromising key
social values and the integrity of the medical profession?
Here I propose an incremental adjustment in the line
drawn by the law, together with safeguards necessary to
ensure that the line holds relatively firm until the next
development in ethical thought and public opinion.
Three levels of professional practice emerge in the
euthanasia debate.13 The first level, abatement of life
sustaining treatment (passive euthanasia) was considered
unlawful until the gradual development of the patient's
constitutional right to privacy and the enactment of
natural death legislation beginning some two decades
ago. The right of the incompetent, as well as the compe-
tent, patient to exercise this right to privacy is now well
established.
It may be appropriate to consider a cautious ap-
proach into the second level of professional practice-
physician assisted suicide. This term encompasses only
the right of the physician, under narrow circumstances, to
provide the medical knowledge and/or medical means to
enable a competent patient to take his own life.
The law would still strictly prohibit all activities
within the third level of professional practice-causing or
inducing suicide (active euthanasia). Thus, it would con-
tinue to be a criminal offense for a physician to take direct
and active means (physical or verbal) to cause or induce
a patient's suicide such as by administering a fatal dose of
morphine or potassium, placing an overdose of drugs in
the patient's hands or mouth, or unduly influencing the
patient.
Under this proposal, law and medical ethics would
continue to maintain the moral distinction between let-
ting die and killing. There remains almost universal
agreement in law and medicine that letting die is ethical,
while killing is not. No such agreement exists on physi-
cian assisted suicide. While both Dr. Kevorkian and Dr.
Quill assisted in their patients' deaths, many observers
reject Dr. Kevorkian's approach, but embrace Dr. Quill's.
Why?
Physician assisted suicide should not be unlawful if
the following conditions are met, most of which were
present in Dr. Quill's report: (1) a long standing physi-
cian/patient relationship; (2) a clearly competent adult
who has been well informed of all of the therapeutic and
palliative alternatives, who has a firm and settled posi-
tion, and who has provided a written consent; and (3) a
confirmed prognosis of terminal illness indicating that the
patient will die within six months. (The requirement that
a terminal illness be present may eventually be found to
be ethically unnecessary; however, such a requirement
represents a cautious approach intended to minimize the
likelihood of abuse.) To help ensure against abuse, the
law could require at least two independent and dispas-
sionate opinions that all of the conditions have been
met-one by a medical specialist confirming the progno-
sis and one by a lay person witnessing the consent. Some
states may require a more formal process conducted by an
agency such as an ombudsman, office of elder affairs, or
ethics committee. At least by some accounts, physician
assistance in dying occurs with some frequency. 4 Estab-
lishing clear rules for the practice rather than benignly
ignoring it will relieve physicians of the secrecy and
isolation imposed by current criminal prohibitions. This
will encourage full consultation with the patient's family
and professional colleagues before medical assistance in
dying is provided.
Justification for this proposed reform of the law
includes greater autonomy and self-determination for
patients, a concept widely affirmed in the legal and ethical
literature. Physician assistance can enable patients to
decide the manner and timing of their death. It is argued
that euthanasia is not a matter of personal autonomy but
a social issue. While it is true that patient autonomy does
not always trump societal interests, taking one's life
privately with medical advice does not trample the rights
of others. Reforming the law of assisted suicide in accor-
dance with specific criteria and procedures, moreover,
represents a social, not a personal resolution of the ethical
dilemma.
Medical advice and assistance at the end of life can
also be comforting for terminally ill patients. It provides
an assurance that when pain and psychological suffering
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become unbearable, patients can rely on their physicians
to help them in achieving a peaceful and dignified death.
The overwhelming majority of patients will never use the
medical knowledge, but are comforted to know that they
will not be abandoned if they need it. It is true that
palliative care can substantially reduce the pain and
discomfort of grave illness. The problem, however, is not
simply pain but fear of debility, dependence, loss of
cognition, and dehumanization from the underlying ill-
ness as well as the powerful effects of sedation.
Medically assisted suicide can also ensure privacy
during the last days and weeks of life, allowing patients to
die in a dignified manner in the place, and with the loved
ones, of their choosing. Orentlicher's and Kass86 both
make a strong case that allowing medical assistance in
dying would undermine the integrity of the profession
and the trust of patients. Yet, a rule which permits, but
does not require, a physician to discuss sensitively and
openly all of the patient's concerns about dying would
likely promote greater respect for the profession in a
country where the public increasingly feels that medicine
is failing the terminally ill. The physician should neither
open the topic nor encourage suicide, but sympathetic
conversation should reassure patients.8 7 Indeed, focusing
policies about death and dying on the medical profession
has distinct benefits since physicians are in the best
position to provide sensitive and informed advice, and the
profession is ethically accountable.
Whenever medical euthanasia is raised, any number
of slippery slope arguments are put forward: What if
physicians go beyond assisting to actual killing? Won't
advocates claim the right for the incompetent as well as
the competent? Will patients commit suicide to avoid
burdening their families, emotionally and financially?
Could patients be subject to undue influences from phy-
sicians and families? What if physicians helped teenagers
or other depressed persons who would have had a change
of heart? Will society's respect for human life diminish?
These are all serious questions. Many already arise in
decisions to abate treatment or in decisions of patients to
take their own lives with or without medical advice. No
proposal to make death more comforting and dignified
for patients can avoid the potential for abuse or the
obvious inconsistencies in where society draws the line.
Assisted suicide is not a panacea for achieving an open
and sensitive discussion of death and a peaceful end of life.
But it can be a small part of a continuum of medical
treatment, palliative care, nurturing, and compassion
that will allow dying patients to feel that they are not
abandoned by the medical profession at a time when they
need it most.
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